CyberWell is an independent non-profit founded in 2022 with a mission to partner with social media and big tech platforms to drive the enforcement and improvement of community standards and hate speech policies across the digital space. Using data-driven analysis, the organisation identifies gaps in enforcement and failures to protect Jewish users from hate and harassment. CyberWell monitors Facebook, Instagram, X (formerly Twitter), TikTok, and YouTube in both English and Arabic.
This report addresses the Royal Commission’s Terms of Reference by examining the nature, prevalence, and key drivers of antisemitism in digital environments, and its impact on Jewish communities, particularly in Australia. It also assesses the role of online platforms in enabling and amplifying antisemitic discourse, including in the lead-up to and aftermath of violent incidents. Drawing on findings from 2022 to early 2026, this submission highlights both enduring antisemitic tropes and event-driven dynamics. It pays particular attention to patterns that emerged before 7 October 2023 and the shift in discourse following the attacks. It also examines the relationship between online rhetoric and offline violence, as well as the ways global antisemitic trends manifest in the Australian context.
This report further identifies gaps in current regulatory and institutional responses and offers policy, regulatory, and enforcement recommendations to counter antisemitism and strengthen social cohesion.
CyberWell’s unique methodology consists of identifying antisemitic keywords, applying a specialised dictionary grounded in the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (hereinafter: “IHRA”) definition of antisemitism. This dictionary is expanded to include emergent antisemitic tropes not explicitly covered in the working definition and is used alongside systematic human review. Each item of content is evaluated by trained analysts with expertise in antisemitism, linguistics, and digital policy to determine both its alignment with antisemitic frameworks and its potential violation of platform rules. Further details are available in CyberWell’s policy guidelines.[i]
CyberWell currently monitors Facebook, Instagram, X (formerly Twitter), TikTok, and YouTube in both English and Arabic. CyberWell serves as trusted flaggers for Meta (Facebook, Instagram, & Threads), TikTok, and YouTube, enabling the organisation to escalate policy-violating content and advise content moderation teams. In May 2022, as part of its strategy to democratise data, CyberWell compiled the first ever open data platform of online antisemitic content.
CyberWell identifies antisemitic content and provides practical, scalable recommendations to platforms to strengthen enforcement. To date, its technology has flagged hundreds of thousands of pieces of content that are highly likely to be antisemitic. Of these, more than 13,000 have been fully analysed, vetted, confirmed as antisemitic, and reported to the platforms. CyberWell has submitted over 300 actionable policy recommendations through 65 real-time alerts, reports, and consultations, resulting in at scale removal of antisemitic content and emerging trends as well as concrete policy updates and policy guidance.
[i] CyberWell. “Policy Guidelines”. n.d. https://cyberwell.org/policy-guidelines/.
Since CyberWell began monitoring online antisemitism in May 2022, dominant narratives have largely reflected longstanding antisemitic tropes adapted to digital spaces. While formats have evolved, appearing as memes, short videos, and coded language, the core themes remain consistent. Social media platforms enable the rapid dissemination of these narratives across linguistic, geographic, and social boundaries, reinforcing their persistence and visibility, including within the Australian context. These dynamics highlight the continuity of antisemitic narratives and the role of digital environments as a key driver in their amplification.
From 2022-2023 CyberWell’s data indicates that the most prevalent forms of antisemitic discourse online were rooted in conspiracy-based narratives that portray Jews as holding disproportionate or covert influence over global governments and systems, such as financial systems and media (see Appendix 1a). Commonly these narratives are characterized as “classic antisemitism” or accusations and tropes consistent with the second example in the IHRA definition of antisemitism. As of 2026, these remain the most common forms of online antisemitism, framing Jews as manipulative and harmful actors.
Common variants include the Rothschild family conspiracy theory[i], often used as a proxy for Jews more broadly (see Appendix 1b), and continued circulation of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion[ii], particularly in the Arabic-language in digital spaces, where it is presented as evidence of a coordinated Jewish plot for global domination (see Appendix 1c).
In the Australian context, these narratives are adopted and localised. Claims of Jewish control over the government remain the most prevalent and persistent tropes and are frequently adapted to local political debates, including around Australia Day and federal elections[iii] (see Appendix 1c, section iii). The persistence of these narratives within Australian discourse highlights their role in undermining trust in democratic institutions and reinforcing exclusionary attitudes towards Jewish communities.
In addition, while The Protocols of the Elders of Zion has served as a global vehicle for promoting conspiracy-based antisemitic tropes, Frank Anstey’s The Kingdom of Shylock[iv] has functioned in a comparable way within Australia by advancing narratives of Jewish control, greed, and financial exploitation. These themes continue to re-emerge in contemporary online discourse (see Appendix 1d).
Religious antisemitism was also prominent during 2022-2023 and continues to appear in contemporary online discourse, drawing on longstanding theological claims such as Jewish deicide (see Appendix 2a), the “Synagogue of Satan” trope[v] (see Appendix 2b), and purposeful misrepresentations of Jewish texts (see Appendix 2c).
These claims were often stripped of context and presented as fact. Accusations of collective Jewish responsibility for the death of Jesus circulated widely, while the “Synagogue of Satan” trope depicted Jews as inherently evil or of the devil. In some cases, such rhetoric can also be linked to real-world violence, including the January arson of a synagogue in Jackson, Mississippi, following which the alleged arsonist referred to the synagogue as a “Synagogue of Satan”.[vi]
In addition, Jewish texts, particularly the Talmud, were frequently misquoted or passages were fabricated to portray Jews as immoral or hostile towards non-Jews. Claiming false passages originate in real texts creates a sense of authenticity and can make this content more likely to be believed and shared (see Appendix 2c).
Holocaust-related antisemitism was another significant component of online antisemitic discourse during this timeframe and remains prominent today. It ranges from denial and minimisation[vii] (see Appendix 3a) to the justification of Nazi persecution and the mocking of Holocaust victims (see Appendix 3b) through humour, memes, and AI-generated content[viii] (hereinafter: “AIGC”). Some posts openly glorify Nazi ideology, including through slogans such as “Hitler was right” (see Appendix 3c). This form of antisemitism often intensifies during periods of conflict involving Jews and Israelis, where it is not only used to justify historical atrocities but also to trivialise or celebrate contemporary violence against Jewish individuals and communities.[ix]
[i] CyberWell. “Who Is Jacob Rothschild and What Is the Rothschild Conspiracy Theory?” 2024. https://cyberwell.org/who-is-jacob-rothschild-and-what-is-the-rothschild-conspiracy-theory/; Britanica. “Where Do Antisemitic Conspiracy Theories About the Rothschild Family Come From?” n.d.
[ii] CyberWell. “World Cup 2022 | Sports Uniting Peoples or a Perfect Storm of Antisemitism?” 2023. https://cyberwell.org/world-cup-2022-sports-uniting-peoples-or-a-perfect-storm-of-antisemitism/; CyberWell. “Elders of Zion 2.0: Antisemitic ‘Tired Islam’ (الأسلام المتعب) Conspiracy Takes Root on Social Media”. November 17, 2025. https://cyberwell.org/news-releases/4255/; USHMM. “Protocols of the Elders of Zion.” n.d. https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/protocols-of-the-elders-of-zion;
[iii] CyberWell. “Behind the Campaign: Antisemitism and Australia’s Online Election Discourse”. 2025. https://cyberwell.org/behind-the-campaign-antisemitism-and-australias-online-election-discourse/.
[iv] Anstey, F. The Kingdom of Shylock: The War Loan and the War Tax. Labor Call Print, 1917. https://samisdat.in/en/books/kingdom-of-shylock-1917.
[v] Network Contagion Research Institute. The “Synagogue of Satan”: The Rise of Religious Antisemitism Online. 2024. https://networkcontagion.us/wp-content/uploads/SynagougeOfSatanReport.pdf; CyberWell. Monetized Antisemitism on YouTube, 8, 18. 2025. https://cyberwell.org/reports/monetized-antisemitism-on-youtube/; CyberWell. “CyberWell Alert: Online Antisemitism Spikes in Response to Ye”. 2022. https://cyberwell.org/reports/cyberwell-alert-online-antisemitism-spikes-in-response-to-ye/.
[vi] CNN. “Jackson Mississippi Synagogue Fire Arson Suspect”. January 13, 2026. https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/13/us/jackson-mississippi-synagogue-fire-arson-suspect.
[vii] CyberWell. “Report: Holocaust Denial and Distortion on Social Media - Yom HaShoah 2023”. 2023. https://cyberwell.org/reports/report-holocaust-denial-and-distortion-on-social-media-yom-hashoah-2023/;
[viii] CyberWell. The state of online antisemitism 2025: From classic tropes to event-driven antisemitism, scapegoating, conspiratorial self-victimization, and the escalation of violence in 2025, 6. 2025 https://cyberwell.org/reports/the-state-of-online-antisemitism-2025-from-classic-tropes-to-event-driven-antisemitism-scapegoating-conspiratorial-self-victimization-and-the-escalation-of-violence-in-2025/; CyberWell. “Ahead of Yom HaShoah, CyberWell Reports Rapid Online Spread of AI-Driven Holocaust Hate Speech”. March 27, 2026. https://cyberwell.org/news-releases/ahead-of-yom-hashoah-cyberwell-reports-rapid-online-spreadd-of-ai-driven-holocaust-hate-speech/; Troschke, Hannah. “Holocaust Distortion and Denial.” In Decoding Antisemitism, ed. Monika J. Becker et al., 237–260. 2024;
World Jewish Congress. “Antisemitism Defined: Why Holocaust Denial and Distortion Is Antisemitic.” n.d. https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/antisemitism-defined-why-holocaust-denial-and-distortion-is-antisemitic.
[ix] Anti-Defamation League. “Antisemitism on Twitter: Reactions to Middle East Conflict.” 2021. https://www.adl.org/resources/article/antisemitism-twitter-reactions-middle-east-conflict; American Jewish Committee. A Guide to Recognizing When Anti-Israel Actions Become Antisemitic. 2021. https://www.ajc.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2021-10/A%20Guide%20to%20Recognizing%20When%20Anti-Israel%20Actions%20Become%20Antisemitic.pdf; CyberWell. “Ahead of Yom HaShoah, CyberWell Reports Rapid Online Spread of AI-Driven Holocaust Hate Speech”. March 27, 2026. https://cyberwell.org/news-releases/ahead-of-yom-hashoah-cyberwell-reports-rapid-online-spreadd-of-ai-driven-holocaust-hate-speech/; CyberWell. “Fighting Hitler-Inspired Jew-Hatred on the Digital Frontlines”. 2023. https://cyberwell.org/fighting-hitler-inspired-jew-hatred-on-the-digital-frontlines/; CyberWell. Israel–Hamas War: November 2023, 5. 2023. https://cyberwell.org/reports/israel-hamas-war-november-2023-trending-antisemitic-narratives-calls-to-violence/; INSS. Arabic and English Antisemitism on Social Media Platforms Post-October 7, 14-15. 2024. https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/special-publication-041124.pdf.
Core antisemitic narratives that predated the 7 October 2023 attacks remain visible online today. However, the violent Hamas terror attacks that were live-streamed directly into powerful engagement algorithms, and the subsequent global rise in violent antisemitic incidents marked a broader shift in online discourse. Antisemitic content became more intense, openly violent, more event-driven, and increasingly linked to expressions of violence.
Following 7 October, CyberWell observed increased support for violent antisemitic attacks, narratives presenting violence as legitimate or deserved, and direct calls for further harm (see Appendix 4a) — consistent with the first example of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism.
This form of antisemitism, the most overt and dangerous form of online antisemitism, more than doubled after 7 October. In the 11 months before the attacks, calls to violence against Jews and justifications thereof accounted for 5.1% of all antisemitic discourse analysed by CyberWell.[i] Eleven months later, that figure rose to 13.3%, and by 2025 it had reached 15.7%.[ii] It was especially prominent following the rise in violent incidents targeting Jewish communities globally[iii] and was further amplified through AIGC[iv], as illustrated in Appendix 4a, section v.
This discourse and real-world violence are closely interconnected. Digital platforms do not merely host such rhetoric – they can also shape, amplify and, in some cases, enable pathways to real-world harm.[v]
This shift is also reflected in the emergence of denial and distortion narratives surrounding attacks against Jews, particularly Conspiratorial Self-Victimisation[vi] (hereinafter: “CSV”). CSV narratives claim that such attacks are orchestrated or fabricated by Jews themselves for political or strategic gain. CyberWell observed this pattern across dozens of incidents since 7 October, including after the Amsterdam pogrom on 8 November 2024[vii] and the Washington, D.C. shooting on 21 May 2025.[viii] This conspiratorial framing reflects a broader global pattern and is also evident in the Australian context. Notably, it was prominent following the Bondi Beach attack (14 December 2025)[ix] and the arson attacks on the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne (6 December 2024 and 4 July 2025) (see Appendix 4b).
By denying violence and recasting victims as perpetrators, these narratives contribute to a cycle of violence and create an environment in which further harm is more easily justified and more likely to occur.[x]
Research shows that bots and AI-driven accounts can mimic human behaviour to spread harmful content online.[xi] CyberWell’s analysis identified similar dynamics in the spread of antisemitic denial and CSV narratives following 7 October. Content denying the scale and nature of the attacks was widely circulated by accounts presenting themselves as credible or citing seemingly “reliable” sources to lend legitimacy.
CyberWell analysed a sample of 300 posts across all major social media platforms denying the 7 October attacks, which collectively reached over 25 million views within weeks, demonstrating how rapidly such narratives can gain mainstream traction.[xii] Separate analysis by Cyabra, the same firm contracted by Elon Musk to determine the presence of fake accounts on X, then Twitter, prior to his purchase of the platform in the fall of 2022, found that, while 11-13% of accounts were estimated to be fake on average before its acquisition by Mr. Musk, around 25% of accounts amplifying leading October 7 denial and CSV narratives were inauthentic, with the maximum amount of bots following and amplifying one prominent account promoting October 7 denial to be as high as 40%.[xiii]
These dynamics highlight how coordinated networks and AIGC act as force multipliers, accelerating the spread and normalisation of antisemitic conspiracy theories. CyberWell’s monitoring further indicates that, after the Bondi Beach attack, significant volumes of antisemitic content were driven by accounts originating outside Australia, often designed to appear locally generated.[xiv]
More broadly, anonymity and pseudonymity further reduce accountability, enabling more extreme rhetoric to spread with limited consequences. Through repetition and visibility, such content moves beyond fringe spaces into mainstream digital environments, where it can become socially validated and normalised.
As a result, digital platforms do not merely host antisemitic content, they actively shape the conditions under which it spreads, gains legitimacy, and influences behaviour. This has direct implications for regulatory and law enforcement responses, particularly in relation to identifying coordinated activity, addressing foreign influence, and interrupting pathways to radicalisation in digital environments.
Event-driven antisemitism is not limited to attacks targeting Jews. CyberWell’s monitoring indicates that, during broader global crises including conflict, political developments, and social unrest, conspiracy-based narratives frequently blame Jews. These narratives align with the third example of the IHRA working definition, blaming or scapegoating Jewish individuals or Jews as an inherently culpable collective for global events, tragedies, social woes, and perceived wrongdoing.
This reflects longstanding antisemitic tropes rooted in both ancient and modern history, including blaming the Jews for the economic ruin and political woes of post-World War I Germany leading up to the election of the Nazi party and Third Reich. CyberWell has consistently identified these narratives and conspiracies on mainstream social media platforms since it began monitoring online antisemitism in 2022. However, since 7 October, and especially during 2025 and early 2026, this trend intensified and become one of the most prevalent forms of online antisemitism.[xv] These narratives assign responsibility to Jewish individuals, institutions, or communities regardless of any actual involvement. This reinforces collective blame and hostility and contributing to conditions that enable the normalisation, justification, and potential escalation of antisemitic violence.
A prominent example is the “109/110” narrative[xvi], which claims that Jews were expelled from numerous countries because of their alleged “destructive” behaviour (see Appendix 4c). The narrative argues that the United States in particular, but also other nations, should become the next, - 110th “country”, to expel Jews. Originating from a Holocaust-denying group in Australia, this narrative has since evolved into a widely circulated meme across social media platforms.
[i] CyberWell. Online Antisemitism: 2024 Annual Report, 2. 2024. https://cyberwell.org/reports/online-antisemitism-2024-annual-report
[ii] CyberWell. The State of Online Antisemitism 2025, 2. 2025.
[iii] CyberWell. Online Antisemitism: 2024 Annual Report, 2. 2024; CyberWell. The State of Online Antisemitism 2025, 3. 2025. CyberWell’s monitoring also found a significant rise in general antisemitic rhetoric across all platforms after the October 7 attacks, with an 86% in the three weeks immediately following 7 October and an overall increase of 36% across the following 11 months. See CyberWell. The Evolution of Online Antisemitism: Pre- & Post October 7, 2. 2024. https://cyberwell.org/reports/the-evolution-of-online-antisemitism-pre-post-october-7/.
[iv] Anti-Defamation League. “Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI) and the Israel-Hamas War.” November 10, 2023. https://www.adl.org/resources/article/generative-artificial-intelligence-gai-and-israel-hamas-war; CyberWell. “Iran, Incitement, and the Internet: How Geopolitical Conflict Reflects Online Antisemitism”. 2025. https://cyberwell.org/iran-incitement-and-the-internet/; Antisemitism Policy Trust. Online Antisemitism and the Risks of Artificial Intelligence. 2024. https://antisemitism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/7112-APT-Ai-and-Anitsemitism-v4.pdf; Combat Antisemitism Movement. “Major Music Streaming Platforms Host Songs Calling to Globalize the Intifada and Bomb Tel Aviv.” November 24, 2025. https://combatantisemitism.org/cam-news/major-music-streaming-platforms-host-songs-calling-to-globalize-the-intifada-and-bomb-tel-aviv/.
[v] The Times of Israel. “Purported Manifesto of DC Shooting Suspect Appears Online”. May 22, 2025. https://www.timesofisrael.com/purported-manifesto-of-dc-shooting-suspect-appears-online/.
[vi] CyberWell. Denial and Conspiratorial Self-Victimization in Antisemitic Discourse. 2026. https://cyberwell.org/reports/denial-and-conspiratorial-self-victimization-in-antisemitic-discourse/; CyberWell. “Antisemitism Trend Alert: Denial of the October 7 Massacre on Social Media Platforms”. 2024.https://cyberwell.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Denial-of-October-7-Social-Media-Trend-Alert-CyberWell.pdf.
[vii] CyberWell. Denial and Conspiratorial Self-Victimization in Antisemitic Discourse, 5, 8. 2026.
[viii] Anti-Defamation League. “Extremists and Conspiracy Theorists Deny the Capital Jewish Museum Shooting With ‘False Flag’ Narrative.” May 23, 2025. https://www.adl.org/resources/article/extremists-and-conspiracy-theorists-deny-capital-jewish-museum-shooting-false; CyberWell. “Antisemitic Incitement and Hate Online: Aftermath of the Capital Jewish Museum Shooting in Washington”. 2025. https://cyberwell.org/reports/antisemitic-incitement-hate-online-aftermath-of-the-capital-jewish-museum-shooting-in-washington/.
[ix] Online Hate Prevention Institute. Bondi Beach Chanukah Massacre, 58–71. 14 January 2026. https://ohpi.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Bondi-Beach-Chanukah-Massacre-small.pdf; CyberWell. Bondi Beach Terror Attack: How Social Media Globalised a Community’s Trauma. 2026.
https://cyberwell.org/reports/bondi-beach-terror-attack-how-social-media-globalised-a-communitys-trauma/; Combat Antisemitism Movement. “Snapshot Study: Bondi Beach Hanukkah Massacre Triggers Online Surge of Anti-Israel Conspiracy Claims.” December 17, 2025. https://combatantisemitism.org/studies-reports/snapshot-study-bondi-beach-hanukkah-massacre-triggers-online-surge-of-anti-israel-conspiracy-claims/.
[x] CyberWell. Denial and Conspiratorial Self-Victimization in Antisemitic Discourse, 5.
[xi] Federal Trade Commission. “Social Media Bots and Deceptive Advertising: Report to Congress”. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/social-media-bots-advertising-ftc-report-congress/socialmediabotsreport.pdf; Fredheim, Rolf, and Sebastian Bay. “How Social Media Companies Are Failing to Combat Inauthentic Behaviour Online”. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, December 2019. https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/how-social-media-companies-are-failing-to-combat-inauthentic-behaviour-online/33; Shao, Chengcheng, et al. “The Spread of Misinformation by Social Bots”. Indiana University, December 2017.
[xii] CyberWell. Antisemitism Trend Alert: Denial of the October 7 Massacre on Social Media Platforms. 2024. https://cyberwell.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Denial-of-October-7-Social-Media-Trend-Alert-CyberWell.pdf.
[xiii] Cyabra. Bot Neworks Amplify Controversial US Influencers. https://cyabra.com/reports/disinformation-hamas-israel-war/.
[xiv] CyberWell. “Bondi Beach Terror Attack: How Social Media Globalised a Community’s Trauma”, 8. 2026. See also Combat Antisemitism Movement, “Snapshot Study: Bondi Beach Hanukkah Massacre”.
[xv] CyberWell. “Charlie Kirk’s Assassination Inspires Antisemitic Accusations and Slurs Online...”. Facebook, September 17, 2025. https://www.facebook.com/CyberWell.org/posts/charlie-kirks-assassination-inspires-antisemitic-accusations-and-slurs-onlinewit/782542654511755/; Southern Poverty Law Center. “Charlie Kirk and Antisemitic Conspiracy Theories”. October 28, 2025 https://www.splcenter.org/resources/hatewatch/charlie-kirk-antisemitic-conspiracy-theories/; The Jerusalem Post. “Antisemitic, anti-Israel conspiracy theories surge following Charlie Kirk's assassination”. September 14, 2025. https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/article-867435; CyberWell. “As Wildfires Continue to Burn in Los Angeles…” Instagram, January 22, 2025.
https://www.instagram.com/cyberwell_org/p/DFIdQaut8xO/; Combat Antisemitism Movement. “Los Angeles Wildfires Exploited to Scapegoat Jews and Israel and Promote Antisemitic Conspiracy Theories”. January 17, 2025. https://combatantisemitism.org/studies-reports/los-angeles-wildfires-exploited-to-scapegoat-jews-and-israel-and-promote-antisemitic-conspiracy-theories/; Anti-Defamation League. “Los Angeles Wildfires Trigger Conspiracy Theories and Hate”. 10 January 2025. https://www.adl.org/resources/article/los-angeles-wildfires-trigger-conspiracy-theories-and-hate; CyberWell. “Developments in Venezuela Are Moving Fast…” Facebook, January 14, 2026.
[xvi] ADL. “Hate Symbol: 109/110”. https://www.adl.org/resources/hate-symbol/109110.
The effectiveness of current platform responses to antisemitism remains uneven. While major social media platforms – X, Meta, TikTok, and YouTube – maintain policies prohibiting hate speech, harassment, and violence, the handling of antisemitic content is inconsistent. These gaps fall into two main areas: policy and enforcement.
As of 2025 and early 2026, CyberWell’s monitoring and analysis indicates that online antisemitic discourse coalesced around three dominant narratives: Jewish control conspiracies, conspiratorial self-victimisation (CSV), and scapegoating.[i] These reflect both longstanding tropes and more recent, event-driven developments.
While most platforms prohibit unfounded conspiracies about undue or malicious Jewish control and enforcement is higher due to their clear classification as violating platforms’ community guidelines, CSV and scapegoating narratives are typically not recognised as policy violative. With the exception of TikTok[ii], platforms do not explicitly address these forms of antisemitism, leaving a structural gap in coverage. As a result, contemporary, event-driven antisemitism frequently falls outside existing policy frameworks and is inconsistently actioned.
Enforcement challenges are most evident in the moderation of coded language and AIGC. While explicit content is often removed, enforcement becomes inconsistent when antisemitism is indirect or framed as humour, commentary, or satire. This is particularly acute in antisemitic AIGC, which surged in mid-2025, where harmful narratives are embedded in formats that obscure intent thus evading detection.[iii]
Platform responses vary significantly. TikTok and Meta have more developed approaches, addressing this type of content within the scope of violations related to hate speech, harassment, and violence.[iv] YouTube focuses mainly on transparency[v], while X lacks a clear AI-specific framework.[vi] These differences contribute to uneven enforcement outcomes, with TikTok and Meta recording significantly higher removal rates for AIGC than YouTube and X.
Delayed enforcement further weakens effectiveness, as action is often taken only after content has reached large audiences. In some cases, antisemitic content accumulates hundreds of thousands or millions of views before intervention, reducing the impact of moderation.
X presents a distinct and significant challenge. Based on CyberWell analysis since 2022, corroborated many other studies published by civil society actors including the Institute for Strategic Dialogue[vii] and Center for Countering Digital Hate[viii], X hosts the highest volume of antisemitic content. This risk is exacerbated by its reliance on visibility restrictions rather than removal where content does not explicitly violate violent content rules. While this may limit reach of certain antisemitic tweets, it is often applied only after widespread exposure, allowing harmful content to remain accessible and continue to circulate despite violating platform standards (see Appendix 1a, section ii).
Algorithmic amplification presents a further challenge. Engagement-driven recommendation systems can prioritise and amplify antisemitic or borderline content, particularly where such material generates high interaction. These systems may create “rabbit hole” effects, exposing users to increasingly similar content over time. At present, the operation of many recommendation algorithms remains opaque, as does the extent to which content moderation policies apply to them.
In the Australian context, these challenges are compounded by both regulatory and jurisdictional gaps. While Australia’s regulatory framework recognises the risks posed by AI-generated content through initiatives such as the National AI Plan[ix] and the AI Safety Institute[x], platform-level enforcement has not kept pace, and existing mitigation measures, such as labelling and watermarking AI-generated content for visibility, remain insufficient. This gap has contributed to the proliferation of antisemitic AIGC, particularly following the Bondi Beach attack.
At the same time, Australia’s Online Safety Codes and Standards, while requiring platforms to address harmful and hate-based content[xi], remain too general to adequately capture contemporary antisemitic iterations such as scapegoating and CSV. This represents a broader policy gap, as such narratives are not recognised as violations in most platform policies.
A separate issue concerns the uneven moderation of cross-border comment sections. While moderation practices for Australian-based publishers have strengthened following Fairfax Media Publications v Voller (2021)[xii], these standards are not consistently applied to international and foreign media outlet accounts (see Appendix 4a, section vi). As a result, Australian users continue to be exposed to unmoderated or poorly moderated antisemitic content in comment sections attached to overseas media.
Overall, while platforms maintain general hate policies, these do not adequately address contemporary forms of antisemitism. Current approaches remain better suited to explicit content than to the increasingly coded, contextual, and synthetic nature of modern antisemitism. This results in a significant gap between policy intent and real-world impact, limiting the effectiveness of current platform and regulatory responses.
[i] CyberWell. The State of Online Antisemitism 2025, 3.
[ii] CyberWell. Denial and Conspiratorial Self-Victimization in Antisemitic Discourse, 11.
[iii] American Jewish Committee. The State of Antisemitism in America 2024–2025: Findings and Recommendations for Major Digital Platforms, 41. 2026. https://www.ajc.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2026-03/SOAR2025-Social-Media-Report.pdf; CyberWell. “‘Promised 3,000 Years Ago’ Antisemitic AI-Generated Meme Takes Flight Online”. 2025. https://cyberwell.org/news-releases/promised-3000-years-ago-antisemitic-ai-generated-meme-takes-flight-online/; Anti-Defamation League. “Coded Hate: Extremists Weaponize Seemingly Innocuous Content to Promote Bigotry.” July 8, 2025. https://www.adl.org/resources/article/coded-hate-extremists-weaponize-seemingly-innocuous-content-promote-bigotry; Middle East Media Research Institute. “The New Battle for Holocaust Memory in the Age of AI”. April 14, 2026; https://www.memri.org/reports/new-battle-holocaust-memory-age-ai; Anti-Defamation League. “Innovative AI Video Generators Produce Antisemitic, Hateful and Violent Outputs”. October 24, 2025. https://www.adl.org/resources/article/innovative-ai-video-generators-produce-antisemitic-hateful-and-violent-outputs.
[iv] TikTok. “AI-Generated Content Policy”. 2024. https://support.tiktok.com/en/using-tiktok/creating-videos/ai-generated-content; TikTok. “Community Guidelines: Edited Media and AI-Generated Content”. 2025. https://www.tiktok.com/safety/en/policies-and-engagement/integrity-authenticity; Meta. “Our Approach to Labeling AI-Generated Content and Manipulated Media”. 2024. https://about.fb.com/news/2024/04/metas-approach-to-labeling-ai-generated-content-and-manipulated-media/.
[v] YouTube. “How YouTube Works: AI”. https://www.youtube.com/intl/en_be/howyoutubeworks/ai/.
[vi] Under its Synthetic and Manipulated Media policy, X includes a clause on “Inauthentic Content”, which states: “You may not share inauthentic media, including, manipulated, or out-of-context media that may result in widespread confusion on public issues, impact public safety, or cause serious harm (‘misleading media’)”. See X. “Rules and Policies: Inauthentic Content”. 2025. https://help.x.com/en/rules-and-policies/authenticity. On March 3, 2026, X also rolled out a new provision that addresses the following: “[…] Users who post AI-generated images of an armed conflict – without adding a disclosure that it was made with AI – will be suspended from Creator Revenue Sharing for 90 days. Subsequent violations will result in a permanent suspension from the program […]”. See X. “Creator Revenue Sharing Policy Update”. March 3, 2026. https://x.com/nikitabier/status/2028873177028555201. However, X does not have a specific, comprehensive policy framework dedicated solely to AIGC.
[vii] Carl Miller et al., Antisemitism on Twitter Before and After Elon Musk’s Acquisition (London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2023).
[viii] Center for Countering Digital Hate. How Twitter/X Continues to Host Posts Reported for Extreme Hate Speech. September 13, 2023.
[ix] Australian Government. “National AI Plan: Keep Australians Safe”. https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/national-ai-plan/keep-australians-safe#building-on-actions-79-whats-next.
[x] Australian Government. “Australia to Establish New Institute to Strengthen AI Safety”. https://www.industry.gov.au/news/australia-establish-new-institute-strengthen-ai-safety.
[xi] eSafety Commissioner. “Industry codes”. https://www.esafety.gov.au/industry/codes
[xii] Ahamed, V. K. (2024). Case analysis navigating social media defamation: Exploring liability for third-party publications in the digital age (the case of Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Voller). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/395397235; Hall & Wilcox. “On the hook via Facebook: High Court upholds potential liability for the defamatory comments of strangers”. https://hallandwilcox.com.au/news/on-the-hook-via-facebook-high-court-upholds-potential-liability-for-the-defamatory-comments-of-strangers/
The patterns identified in this report have direct and measurable implications for the daily lives of Jewish Australians. While much of the antisemitic discourse analysed originates in digital environments, its effects extend beyond online spaces, shaping perceptions of safety, belonging, and participation in public life.
The scale, visibility, and normalisation of antisemitic narratives online, including hateful conspiracy theories and content that justifies or glorifies violence, contribute to an environment in which Jewish Australians are exposed to persistent hostility. Even where such content does not translate into immediate physical incidents, its volume and recurrence reinforce a sustained sense of risk and insecurity.
Event-driven antisemitism spikes further intensify these conditions. Following major incidents, including the Bondi Beach terror attack and attacks targeting Jewish institutions, online environments rapidly circulate celebration of the attacks, Conspiratorial Self-Victimisation, and even proactive calls for additional harm. This undermines the legitimacy of Jewish victims, erodes public understanding of events, and contributes to the normalisation and, in some cases, endorsement of antisemitic hostility.
These dynamics have practical consequences. In the Australian context, global antisemitic narratives increasingly shape domestic discourse. Coordinated and inauthentic content originating outside Australia can appear locally generated, increasing its credibility and reach. This distorts public discourse, amplifies harmful narratives, and exacerbates community anxiety.
Crucially, current responses are not keeping pace with the scale, speed, and evolution of these dynamics. Addressing these impacts requires coordinated and strengthened intervention across regulatory, platform, and community frameworks.
Based on the findings and analysis presented in this report, the following recommendations set out targeted measures to address the evolving and increasingly complex nature of online antisemitism. They focus on identified gaps in the regulation, moderation, and enforcement of antisemitic content across digital platforms, particularly where such content is produced in, or accessible within, Australia.
As this report demonstrates, while most online antisemitism in Australia is driven by global narratives, local dynamics increasingly shape how it is expressed, amplified, and receive. This exacts an increasingly heavier price for the Jewish community in Australia and increases security risks for all Australians. Understanding this interaction is critical to developing effective policy and regulatory responses especially in responding to rapidly evolving, event-driven forms of antisemitism.
The following recommendations are therefore directed at addressing gaps identified in relation to the Terms of Reference. Particularly in strengthening government responses, supporting law enforcement and regulatory frameworks, and preventing the escalation of antisemitism in digital environments.
The Australian Government should operationalise the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) definition of antisemitism[i] across regulatory and platform governance frameworks. While the definition has been formally adopted, its practical application remains limited and inconsistent. To address this, the IHRA definition should be embedded within regulatory instruments, including Australia’s Online Safety Codes and Standards, requiring platforms to align their hate speech and harmful content policies with recognised forms of antisemitism, including those outlined in the IHRA examples. In practice, this would require platforms to explicitly classify and moderate content falling within these categories including (but not limited to):
Platforms should be required to treat such content as policy-violating and subject to appropriate enforcement actions, including removal or restriction, depending on severity of context.
Minimum baseline standards should be established to ensure consistency across platforms, supported by clear regulatory guidance and oversight. Non-compliance should attract proportionate regulatory consequences, including penalties where platforms fail to adequately address antisemitic content.
This would ensure that contemporary and evolving forms of antisemitism are consistently recognised and addressed across platforms, reducing current gaps in policy coverage and enforcement.
The Australian Government should formally recognise Conspiratorial Self-Victimisation as a contemporary form of antisemitism within its National Antisemitism Framework. This recognition should be reflected in the Online Safety Codes and Standards, requiring platforms to explicitly classify and enforce CSV narratives within hate speech or harmful conduct policies.
Platforms already recognise and enforce certain established forms of antisemitism, such as Holocaust denial and conspiratorial narratives of Jewish control. These frameworks demonstrate that complex and context-dependent antisemitic narratives can be effectively identified and moderated.
CSV narratives, however, despite serving a similar function in denying harm, distorting reality, and justifying hostility, are not consistently recognised or actioned within existing policy frameworks.
Platforms should therefore be required to detect, moderate, and report on CSV-related content. This will ensure that contemporary, event-driven forms of antisemitism – such as those observed following the October 7 and the Bondi Beach attacks, are not excluded from enforcement mechanisms.
The Online Safety Codes and Standards should require platforms to ensure that existing hate speech rules apply equally to AIGC. Given the increasing use of synthetic media to produce misleading antisemitic narratives, enforcement mechanisms must be adapted accordingly. This includes improving detection, labelling, and removal processes for AIGC that spreads antisemitic narratives or distorts real-world events.
Australia’s Online Safety Codes and Standards should require platforms to implement consistent and robust enforcement against coded antisemitic language. This should include the use of contextual analysis tools, updated enforcement guidance, and regular review of emerging coded expressions. Greater attention to this form of content is necessary, as it is often enforced inconsistently. Strengthening guidance and enforcement in this area is critical to effectively addressing contemporary manifestations of antisemitism.[ii]
The Online Safety Codes and Standards should require platforms to implement consistent moderation standards for comment sections, including those attached to international news content accessible in Australia. Where adequate moderation cannot be ensured, comment sections should be restricted or disabled in specific cases of reporting on violent antisemitic incidents to prevent further calls for violence.
Australia’s Online Safety Codes and Standards should encourage platforms to adopt rapid-response protocols during periods of heightened geopolitical tension or in the aftermath of major incidents, when antisemitic content often surges. Such protocols should include enhanced detection and temporary escalation measures to limit the spread of harmful narratives, particularly justification of violence against the Jewish community, scapegoating, and conspiracy-based claims. Platforms should be required to demonstrate compliance with these standards through regular reporting and audits overseen by the eSafety Commissioner.
The Online Safety Codes and Standards should strengthen measures aimed at addressing harmful activity originating from anonymous or pseudonymous accounts. This may include safeguards such as geolocation-based tools, as implemented on platforms like X[iii], to identify patterns of abuse while maintaining privacy protections.
Efforts to address online antisemitism should be coordinated with offline initiatives, including education and community engagement under Australia’s National Strategy to Combat Antisemitism. While these efforts are often developed and implemented separately, the findings of this report demonstrate that antisemitic narratives increasingly move fluidly between online and offline environments, reinforcing and amplifying one another.
To operationalise this, the Australian Government should:
These measures would ensure that insights from digital environments directly inform offline interventions, thereby strengthening early identification, prevention, and community resilience.
Australia’s Online Safety Codes and Standards should require platforms to publish regular, standardised transparency reports on antisemitic content.
These reports should include:
Reporting should occur at consistent intervals (e.g. quarterly) and be overseen by the eSafety Commissioner, who should be empowered to audit data, require additional disclosures, and enforce compliance through existing regulatory mechanisms, including penalties for non-compliance.
[i] International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. “Working Definition of Antisemitism”. https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism.
[ii] CyberWell. CyberWell Policy Recommendations | Regarding Meta Oversight Board Cases Involving Coded Language and Racial Discrimination via Emojis. https://cyberwell.org/reports/cyberwell-policy-recommendations-regarding-meta-oversight-board-cases-involving-coded-language-and-racial-discrimination-via-emojis/.
[iii] Business Insider. “X Shows Locations Users About This Account”. November 2025. https://www.businessinsider.com/x-shows-locations-users-about-this-account-2025-11.
This appendix provides illustrative examples of online antisemitic content identified by CyberWell, organised by narrative category. Examples are presented for evidentiary purposes. Some content included is related to Australia, while other examples reflect broader global trends. The material is drawn from both English and Arabic language sources.
a. Jewish Control Conspiracies
Description:
Narratives claiming that Jews control governments, media, or financial systems.
Examples:
i. Instagram post, 18 April 2025. The post below promotes antisemitic rhetoric by portraying Jews as those who control global power structures. The figures depicted resemble the Happy Merchant, a widely circulated antisemitic caricature used to depict Jews as greedy, manipulative, and conspiratorial.
ii. X post, 18 July 2025. In the tweet below, the user promotes antisemitic conspiracy theories by alleging that Jews control the media.
NOTE: After CyberWell’s escalation, the post remained online but subsequently received a visibility restriction for Hateful Conduct – only after it had already been viewed more than 165K times.
iii. X post, 20 April 2025. The tweet below illustrates a conspiratorial narrative of Jewish control over the Australian government. The post claims that a political leader is “owned by Zionists”, a term frequently used as a proxy for Jews. This framing implies covert and coercive control of political figures by Jewish interests. Such narratives promote the idea that Jewish influence is manipulative and incompatible with democratic governance, thereby undermining trust in political institutions and processes. By portraying both the political figure and their supporters as complicit in this alleged control, the content further reinforces exclusionary and delegitimising narratives directed at Jewish individuals and communities.
b. Rothschild Conspiracy Theory
Description:
Narratives that use the Rothschild family as a symbol of alleged Jewish control over global finance and political systems.
Examples:
i. Facebook post, 16 October 2025. The post below promotes antisemitic conspiracy theories about Jewish control. The user's caption states: “[...] The world is corrupt and many lies have been told that's why the Rothschild Dynasty on behalf of the illuminati is working on creating the New World Order (N.W.O) for the prosperity and advancement of mankind [...]”. When the user claims that the Jewish Rothschild family is connected to the illuminati, they are advancing the antisemitic conspiracy theory that Jews are secretly working to establish all-powerful control by creating a New World Order. In this case, the New World Order conspiracy theory is antisemitic because it is specifically tied to the user's reference of the Jewish Rothschild family and their alleged ties to the illuminati.
ii. TikTok post 4 December 2025. The video below promotes the antisemitic conspiracy theory that suggests Jews control the Vatican. The user's video begins by featuring images of the Pope bowing to various Jewish figures [00:04-00:13], before proceeding to highlight the user's Google search for "Vatican and the Rothschilds" [00:13-00:19]. The user continues to show images of Jewish boys and men wearing yarmulkes [00:32-00:45] in order to draw parallels between the Jewish yarmulke and the Pope's cap - an allusion to alleged Jewish influence. The video concludes by showing the user searching for "Rothschilds by Nationality" on Google, with results highlighting the Rothschild dynasty's Jewish identity [00:44-00:49]. In response to their video, the user's caption states: "This video will blow your mind conspiracy about Jewish Vatican [...] #jewish [...] #vatican". As seen in this post, both the user's text and images promote the antisemitic conspiracy theory that Jews exert control over the Pope and the Vatican.
c. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion
Description:
The continued circulation of this fabricated text as supposed evidence of a coordinated Jewish plan for global domination.
Examples:
i. Facebook post, 1 December 2025. The example below invokes The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as a framework to support multiple conspiracy claims about Jewish control over global systems. By presenting these narratives as a “direct descendant” of the Protocols, the content draws on a historically discredited text to legitimise allegations of coordinated Jewish influence over finance, governments, and international affairs. This reflects the continued adaptation of Protocols-based conspiracies in contemporary online discourse.
Post Status: Removed after CyberWell reported
ii. Facebook post, 8 December 2024. The Arabic-language post below implies that the events in Syria and the resulting disorder are part of a Jewish master plan, as described in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The post when translated into English states: "The password for the fall of Syria is the Greater Middle East. The project is being achieved with steady steps. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion". This reflects the continued use of Protocols-based narratives to portray Jews as a covert and manipulative force behind global affairs.
d. “Shylock” Trope
Description:
Use of the “Shylock” figure as a derogatory reference to Jews in financial contexts, reinforcing stereotypes of greed or exploitation.
Examples:
i. X post, 21 March 2026. The example below promotes antisemitic rhetoric through the use of the “Shylock” trope and related stereotypes that portray Jews as deceitful, exploitative, and inherently untrustworthy. The inclusion of terms such as “shylock” alongside slurs and the depiction of the Happy Merchant caricature reinforces longstanding narratives that associate Jewish identity with dishonesty and financial manipulation. The exaggerated visual features and language used in the image further dehumanise Jews, drawing on historical stereotypes rooted in the “Shylock” figure from The Merchant of Venice. Together, these elements perpetuate antisemitic tropes that frame Jews as morally corrupt and parasitic.
ii. X post, 15 May 2025. The Arabic-language post states: “انتم عبدة المال على مر العصور والتاريخ شايلوك اليهودي كان خير من مثلكم,” which translates to: “You have been worshippers of money throughout the ages and history; Shylock the Jew was better than people like you.” The comment is directed at a Jewish user in response to a discussion about ties between United States President Donald Trump and Muslim states. This content is antisemitic because it invokes “Shylock the Jew”, a character historically used as a symbol of Jewish greed and usury, and connects Jewish identity to money obsession, reinforcing longstanding stereotypes that portray Jews as defined by financial exploitation and materialism.
2. Religious Antisemitism
a. Jews Killed Jesus
Description:
Narratives that assign collective responsibility to Jews for the death of Jesus, often used to justify hostility, exclusion, or moral condemnation of Jewish individuals and communities.
Examples:
i. Instagram post, February 4 2026. The post below promotes religious antisemitism by invoking the claim that Jews “killed Christ”, assigning collective guilt to Jewish individuals and communities. Combined with the “Synagogue of Satan” trope and dehumanising imagery such as the Happy Merchant, this post portrays Jews as inherently evil.
ii. X post, November 26 2025. This example, posted by an Australian user, promotes religious antisemitism by explicitly stating that Jews “killed Jesus”, assigning collective guilt to Jewish individuals and communities. The content combines this accusation with stereotypes of Jewish greed and references to “Zionist usury”, reinforcing longstanding theological and economic antisemitic tropes. By framing Jews as both responsible for the death of Jesus and as morally corrupt, the post perpetuates a historical narrative that has been used to justify hostility towards Jews. This example demonstrates the continued presence of religious antisemitism within Australian online discourse.
iii. YouTube post, 7 August 2023. The post is antisemitic because it promotes the claim that Jews killed Jesus while combining it with additional conspiratorial and dehumanising rhetoric. By stating that Jews are responsible for the death of Jesus, the content repeats a historically harmful accusation that has been used for centuries to justify discrimination and violence against Jews. The post reinforces this by referring to Jews as “small hats”, a derogatory term referring to the fact that religious Jewish men wear head coverings, and by claiming that they “control the media” and “own” what people see and hear. These elements together portray Jews as collectively guilty, deceptive, and manipulative, which aligns with well-established antisemitic tropes and contributes to the spread of hostility towards Jews.
b. Synagogue of Satan
Description:
Narratives based on misinterpretations of Christian scripture that portray Jews as inherently evil or aligned with malevolent forces, often used to delegitimise Jewish religious identity.
Examples:
i. TikTok post, 9 February 2026. This example promotes religious antisemitism using the “Synagogue of Satan” trope to portray Jews as inherently evil and aligned with malevolent forces. By invoking this interpretation of religious scripture, the content frames Jews as morally corrupt and opposed to legitimate religious identity.
ii. YouTube post, 6 January 2026. The example below promotes religious antisemitism through the repeated use of the “Synagogue of Satan” trope, portraying Jews as inherently evil and illegitimate. This framing is reinforced through conspiratorial claims, including the Khazar theory and false historical accusations, which seek to delegitimise Jewish identity and present Jews as inherently evil.
iii. YouTube post, 3 December 2022. This example promotes religious antisemitism through the “Synagogue of Satan” trope, which depicts Jews as spiritually corrupt or inherently evil. In the video, the speaker claims that “unspiritual […] Jews […] were all part of the same Synagogue because they weren't Jews inwardly” [2:47:10-2:47:44]. reframing Jewish identity as illegitimate and morally deficient. By asserting that Jews are not “true” Jews and associating them with spiritual corruption, this example advances a longstanding antisemitic narrative that portrays Jews as deceptive and illegitimate.
c. Vilification of Jewish Texts
Description:
Narratives that misrepresent, distort, or fabricate content from Jewish religious texts (particularly the Talmud) to portray Jewish beliefs as immoral, harmful, or hostile toward non-Jews.
Examples:
i. YouTube post, 7 January 2026. This YouTube example promotes religious antisemitism through the vilification of Jewish religious texts, particularly the Talmud. The content falsely attributes responsibility for the death of Jesus to teachings within the Talmud, misrepresenting the text to portray Jewish beliefs as inherently immoral and hostile. This framing is further reinforced through conspiratorial claims linking Jewish religious tradition to broader narratives of global control, including references to a “New World Order”, another longstanding antisemitic narrative.
ii. X post, February 19 2026. The Australian-based post below promotes antisemitic narratives through the vilification of Jewish religious texts, particularly the Talmud, and the invocation of blood libel imagery. It suggests that Jewish beliefs are inherently immoral or harmful, misrepresenting the Talmud to reinforce stereotypes portraying Jewish religion as dangerous and corrupt. The post refers to the arrest of Brandan Koschel on Australia Day after he incited hatred toward Jews during an anti-immigration protest, and attributes blame to Jewish Magistrate Sharon Freund. The tweet states: “Magistrate and baby eater Sharon Freund. She most likely believes the Talmud as well”, in response to a post about Magistrate Freund presiding over the case of a man jailed for calling “Jews the greatest enemy” of the nation. By referring to the judge as a “baby eater”, the post draws directly on the blood libel myth, which falsely accuses Jews of harming children. The derogatory reference to the Talmud further perpetuates negative stereotypes about Jewish religious teachings. This framing suggests that the judge’s Jewish identity renders her inherently corrupt or malicious, thereby promoting hatred and dehumanisation of Jews.
iii. Facebook post, 20 July 2023. The post below engages in religious vilification by portraying core Jewish religious texts and beliefs as inherently evil and malicious. By claiming that “every single aspect of the Jewish Talmud is Satanic” and presenting alleged quotations to depict Jews as hateful towards non-Jews, the post misrepresents and demonises Judaism as a religion. It takes this demonisation further by invoking Christian scripture to label Jews as a “Synagogue of Satan”, suggesting that Jewish religious communities are aligned with evil and are persecuting others. This framing does not critique specific ideas but instead targets Judaism as a whole, portraying it as deceitful, dangerous, and morally corrupt, which constitutes religious vilification and promotes hostility towards Jews.
3. Holocaust Hate Speech
a. Holocaust Denial and Distortion
Description:
Narratives that deny that the Holocaust occurred or reject established historical evidence, including claims that the events were fabricated or exaggerated.
Examples:
i. TikTok post, 17 February 2026. The example below promotes Holocaust denial and distortion through the use of coded language and trivialising imagery. The video references the six million Jewish victims with the phrase “6 million muffins”. The dialogue reinforces this distortion by suggesting a significantly lower number of victims: "[...] OMG I'm so sorry […] I was only able to make around 271,000 [...]" [00:06-00:11] which reflects a common denial tactic aimed at minimising the scale of the atrocities, by falsely claiming that only 271K Jews were murdered during the Holocaust.
ii. Instagram post, 12 June 2025. The example below promotes Holocaust denial and distortion through satirical, coded analogies that question the historical reality of the genocide of six million Jews. The AI-generated video uses the metaphor of “six million pizzas”, asking, “Can you really bake six million pizzas in five years?”, to mirror denialist arguments about the supposed logistical impossibility of the Holocaust. This framing is reinforced through references to common denial tropes, including infrastructure claims such as: “We don’t even have a chimney!” and reduced victim figures such as “271,000”, which are frequently used to minimise the scale of the atrocities. The content also implies fabrication of historical evidence, with statements suggesting the figure was invented “I would just lie and say they did it”. By presenting these claims through humour and parody, the video trivialises the Holocaust and reframes denial as skepticism, reinforcing antisemitic narratives in a stylised and accessible format.
b. Holocaust Mockery
Description:
Narratives that mock the Holocaust through humour, memes, or inappropriate comparisons, diminishing the significance of the atrocities and the experiences of victims.
Examples:
i. X post, 22 December 2025. This tweet promotes antisemitic narratives through Holocaust mockery, using exaggerated references to “six million” victims to ridicule Jewish suffering. This AI generated video of the Bondi Beach terrorist attack depicts a staged attack scenario, with characters explicitly suggesting that victims are “acting” and that the event is fabricated for political and financial gain. By combining Holocaust mockery with false flag conspiracy claims (portraying the attacker as linked to Israel) this post diminishes the severity of antisemitic attacks while reinforcing conspiratorial narratives that portray Jewish victimhood as fabricated or manipulative.
ii. TikTok post, 15 December 2025. The video below promotes Holocaust mockery through the sarcastic use of “6 million”, a figure intrinsically associated with the Holocaust, to mock the Bondi Beach terrorist attack that murdered 15 Jews. By applying this number in an exaggerated and ironic context, the content trivialises Jewish suffering and implies skepticism toward the scale of the Holocaust.
c. Holocaust Justification
Description: Holocaust justification refers to statements or narratives that portray the Holocaust as justified, deserved, or acceptable, often endorsing or legitimising violence against Jews.
Examples:
i. X post, 1 March 2026. In the Arabic-language post below, the user responds to a tweet with a statement justifying the Holocaust. The reply was posted in response to reports of the Iranian missile strike in Beit Shemesh on the same day, which killed nine Israeli civilians, and states: “Truly Hitler was right” [emphasis added]. This statement explicitly endorses Hitler’s genocide of Jews and frames the Holocaust as justified, thereby promoting genocidal ideology and legitimising violence against Jews.
4. Post-7 October Antisemitic Narratives
a. Glorification and Justification of Violence
Description:
Content that praises, celebrates, or expresses support for acts of violence targeting Jews, including framing such attacks as justified or desirable. This includes content that portrays violence against Jews as legitimate, deserved, or necessary, as well as calls for further acts of harm.
Examples:
i. X post, 22 May 2025. The Arabic-language post below demonstrates the glorification of antisemitic violence in response to the 2025 Washington, D.C. shooting in which two Jewish Israeli embassy workers were murdered. The post praises the perpetrator and attributes value to the act, framing the violence as justified and commendable. The user shares the shooter's image and writes (translated from Arabic): “Bless your hands, Elias Rodriguez […] you are worth thousands of the sleeping Arabs”. By celebrating the attacker and elevating the act of violence, the content normalises and endorses harm against Jewish individuals.
iii. TikTok post, 22 December 2025. The TikTok example below promotes antisemitic violence through the explicit glorification of the Bondi Beach terrorist attack targeting Jews. The use of “-15🧃” in reference to the number of victims, combined with celebratory imagery and music, glorifies the murder of Jews. The inclusion of the juice box emoji, a known coded reference to Jews due to the near homophone of “Jews” and “juice”, further reinforces the antisemitic nature of the content. By celebrating the killing of Jews, the video ultimately glorifies and encourages hostility and violence against Jews.
iii. X post, 14 December 2025. This Arabic-language example below promotes antisemitic violence as the user expresses explicit desire for harm towards the victims and their families. The tweet shows an image of a victim of the Bondi Beach terrorist attack and his family. The supporting statement in Arabic (translated to English) states: “I wish they died and were tortured in the utmost and extreme way with him”. Such content contributes to the normalisation of hostility and dehumanisation, reinforcing environments in which antisemitic violence is encouraged and legitimised.
iv. X post, June 15 2025. Referring to the Israel-Iran war in June 2025, the Arabic-language example below promotes explicit calls for further violence against Jews, including language that advocates killing and destruction on a collective scale. Translated from Arabic the post states: “Treachery is in their blood, may God break them. Kill the Jews, burn Israel above and below. Before they are able to burn Iran further, let us be the ones to start”. The use of dehumanising rhetoric, such as portraying Jews as inherently treacherous, reinforces narratives that frame them as an existential threat. By invoking both religious and nationalistic justifications for violence, the content seeks to legitimise and encourage mass harm against Jewish individuals and communities.
v. YouTube post, 28 June 2025. The video below is set to the Suno AI-generated song “Boom, Boom, Tel Aviv”. It features images of destruction in Israel during the 12-day war with Iran in June 2025, while the audio justifies and celebrates the deaths of Jews. The song’s lyrics include: “Boom, boom, Tel Aviv. This is what you get, for all your evil deeds […] You brought this upon yourself, it's your time to bleed […] Humanity never expected good behaviour from you Jews” [00:00–00:55].
vi. Instagram post, 14 December 2025. The Arabic-language example below highlights the comment section of an Al Jazeera news post. The featured comment calls for further violence against Jews, stating in Arabic (translated to English): “O God, add to their dead”, in response to coverage of the Bondi Beach terrorist attack in which 15 Jews were killed. This content demonstrates the normalisation of antisemitic discourse within comment sections and constitutes an explicit endorsement of continued violence against Jewish individuals.
b. Denial and CSV Narratives
Description:
Narratives that deny contemporary antisemitic attacks or claim that violence against Jews is orchestrated or fabricated by Jews themselves for political or strategic gain. These narratives reframe victims as perpetrators and undermine sympathy for those targeted.
Examples:
i. TikTok post, 19 November 2024. In the TikTok post below, the speaker disputes the characterization of the 7 November 2024, antisemitic mob attack in Amsterdam as a pogrom. The speaker states: “[...] Only a couple days after the ADL said that I was antisemitic for not calling the football hooligan fight a, you know, a pogrom [...] Israeli mob violence in Amsterdam [...] false narrative insistently advanced by its own newspaper that the Israeli fans were victims of mob violence motivated by anti-Jewish hatred [...]” [00:15-02:43]. Alongside the video, the user adds the following description: “The so-called Amsterdam pogrom wasn’t actually a pogrom after all […]”.
ii. YouTube post, 10 January 2025. The video below, titled: “Oct 7 r*pe hoax debunked... again”, promotes denial of antisemitic violence by dismissing documented accounts of sexual violence during the 7 October attacks. By framing these crimes as a “hoax” and asserting a lack of evidence or victims, the content rejects survivor testimony and undermines the credibility of those affected. The speaker repeatedly denies the mass sexual assaults committed against Jews and Israelis stating in the podcast that: “there are zero complainants of alleged cases of rapes committed by Palestinians on October 7th, and no organized chains of evidence [...] Israel still can't find any October 7th rape victims, there's no testimony, no evidence [...]” [00:34-00:53].
iii. Facebook post, 2 June 2025. The example below refers to the deadly Molotov cocktail attack on Jewish Protesters in Boulder, Colorado, from 1 June. The user claims that the perpetrator of the attack was Jewish, describing the incident as a “false flag” and calling for an investigation into his alleged Jewish ancestry.
iv. X post, 15 December 2025. The example below, which refers to the 14 December 2025, Bondi Beach terrorist attack, is antisemitic because it promotes a conspiracy narrative suggesting that the attack against Jews was staged. This framing undermines the credibility of victims and suggests that harm against Jews is exaggerated or orchestrated for strategic purposes. In doing so, it reflects a core CSV narrative that distorts antisemitic violence and shifts suspicion onto Jewish victims themselves.
v. X post, 5 July 2025. The tweet below similarly implies that a Jew was responsible for the arson attack on the East Melbourne Synagogue on 4 July 2025. In response to another tweet questioning the suspect, the user replied: “Found him” accompanied by an image of a religious Jew wearing a kippah and sidelocks, who appears to have a genetic disorder. This post not only constitutes CSV against Jews but also relies on a harmful generalization portraying Jews, including religious Jews, as having genetic disorders.
c. Scapegoating During Global Crises
Description:
Narratives that blame Jews for broader global events or crises, attributing responsibility to Jewish individuals, institutions, or communities regardless of actual involvement.
Examples:
i. Instagram post, June 15 2025. The post below blends authentic imagery with AIGC to reinforce antisemitic narratives. The post scapegoats Jews and Israelis for causing the Patagonia wildfires in Argentina, linking these alleged actions to a broader conspiracy theory that suggests Jews seek territorial acquisition and economic control. The video incorporates real-life footage of an individual alleged to be ‘Israeli’ starting a fire in Patagonia in an attempt to lend credibility to a conspiratorial and misleading claim.
ii. Instagram post, January 15 2026. The example below promotes antisemitic scapegoating through the use of the “109/110” trope, a coded reference to the conspiracy that Jews were expelled from 109 countries due to their own alleged wrongdoing. By framing repeated expulsion as evidence of Jewish misconduct, the content shifts responsibility onto Jews and portrays them as inherently problematic. The video shows a man working out in a gym while “Hava Nagila” [a Jewish folk song] plays in the background. The speaker states: “I was kicked out of 109 different bars. Is it my fault or the bars' fault? Yeah, all 109 different bars’ fault. I mean, if I’m getting kicked out of bars, it’s most likely my fault. I’m not acting respectfully; I’m doing something to get myself kicked out. I mean, 109?”. This logic positions Jews as responsible for the discrimination they faced and suggests that repeated expulsions must reflect their own misconduct.
iii. TikTok post, November 8 2025. The example below promotes antisemitic scapegoating through the use of the “109/110” trope, combined with dehumanising and mocking portrayals of Jewish identity. The video depicts a figure styled as an Orthodox Jew dancing in front of Auschwitz, alongside imagery portraying Jews as sexually deviant at the Western Wall. The accompanying audio explicitly references the “109” trope, stating: “109 times but it was never our fault. Hashem [God], please help us Jews […]” [00:14–00:19]. This reference invokes a coded antisemitic myth that falsely claims Jews have been expelled from 109 countries throughout history and suggests that a “110th” country should do the same. By pairing this narrative with mocking imagery and exaggerated stereotypes, the content frames Jews as inherently problematic and deserving of exclusion. Taken together, these elements exemplify antisemitic scapegoating by assigning collective blame, ridiculing Jewish identity, and reframing persecution as justified.
[1] CyberWell. “Policy Guidelines”. n.d. https://cyberwell.org/policy-guidelines/.
[2] CyberWell. “Who Is Jacob Rothschild and What Is the Rothschild Conspiracy Theory?” 2024. https://cyberwell.org/who-is-jacob-rothschild-and-what-is-the-rothschild-conspiracy-theory/; Britanica. “Where Do Antisemitic Conspiracy Theories About the Rothschild Family Come From?” n.d.
[3] CyberWell. “World Cup 2022 | Sports Uniting Peoples or a Perfect Storm of Antisemitism?” 2023. https://cyberwell.org/world-cup-2022-sports-uniting-peoples-or-a-perfect-storm-of-antisemitism/; CyberWell. “Elders of Zion 2.0: Antisemitic ‘Tired Islam’ (الأسلام المتعب) Conspiracy Takes Root on Social Media”. November 17, 2025. https://cyberwell.org/news-releases/4255/; USHMM. “Protocols of the Elders of Zion.” n.d. https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/protocols-of-the-elders-of-zion;
[4] CyberWell. “Behind the Campaign: Antisemitism and Australia’s Online Election Discourse”. 2025. https://cyberwell.org/behind-the-campaign-antisemitism-and-australias-online-election-discourse/.
[5] Anstey, F. The Kingdom of Shylock: The War Loan and the War Tax. Labor Call Print, 1917. https://samisdat.in/en/books/kingdom-of-shylock-1917.
[6] Network Contagion Research Institute. The “Synagogue of Satan”: The Rise of Religious Antisemitism Online. 2024. https://networkcontagion.us/wp-content/uploads/SynagougeOfSatanReport.pdf; CyberWell. Monetized Antisemitism on YouTube, 8, 18. 2025. https://cyberwell.org/reports/monetized-antisemitism-on-youtube/; CyberWell. “CyberWell Alert: Online Antisemitism Spikes in Response to Ye”. 2022. https://cyberwell.org/reports/cyberwell-alert-online-antisemitism-spikes-in-response-to-ye/.
[7] CNN. “Jackson Mississippi Synagogue Fire Arson Suspect”. January 13, 2026. https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/13/us/jackson-mississippi-synagogue-fire-arson-suspect.
[8] CyberWell. “Report: Holocaust Denial and Distortion on Social Media - Yom HaShoah 2023”. 2023. https://cyberwell.org/reports/report-holocaust-denial-and-distortion-on-social-media-yom-hashoah-2023/;
[9] CyberWell. The state of online antisemitism 2025: From classic tropes to event-driven antisemitism, scapegoating, conspiratorial self-victimization, and the escalation of violence in 2025, 6. 2025 https://cyberwell.org/reports/the-state-of-online-antisemitism-2025-from-classic-tropes-to-event-driven-antisemitism-scapegoating-conspiratorial-self-victimization-and-the-escalation-of-violence-in-2025/; CyberWell. “Ahead of Yom HaShoah, CyberWell Reports Rapid Online Spread of AI-Driven Holocaust Hate Speech”. March 27, 2026. https://cyberwell.org/news-releases/ahead-of-yom-hashoah-cyberwell-reports-rapid-online-spreadd-of-ai-driven-holocaust-hate-speech/; Troschke, Hannah. “Holocaust Distortion and Denial.” In Decoding Antisemitism, ed. Monika J. Becker et al., 237–260. 2024;
World Jewish Congress. “Antisemitism Defined: Why Holocaust Denial and Distortion Is Antisemitic.” n.d. https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/antisemitism-defined-why-holocaust-denial-and-distortion-is-antisemitic.
[10] Anti-Defamation League. “Antisemitism on Twitter: Reactions to Middle East Conflict.” 2021. https://www.adl.org/resources/article/antisemitism-twitter-reactions-middle-east-conflict; American Jewish Committee. A Guide to Recognizing When Anti-Israel Actions Become Antisemitic. 2021. https://www.ajc.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2021-10/A%20Guide%20to%20Recognizing%20When%20Anti-Israel%20Actions%20Become%20Antisemitic.pdf; CyberWell. “Ahead of Yom HaShoah, CyberWell Reports Rapid Online Spread of AI-Driven Holocaust Hate Speech”. March 27, 2026. https://cyberwell.org/news-releases/ahead-of-yom-hashoah-cyberwell-reports-rapid-online-spreadd-of-ai-driven-holocaust-hate-speech/; CyberWell. “Fighting Hitler-Inspired Jew-Hatred on the Digital Frontlines”. 2023. https://cyberwell.org/fighting-hitler-inspired-jew-hatred-on-the-digital-frontlines/; CyberWell. Israel–Hamas War: November 2023, 5. 2023. https://cyberwell.org/reports/israel-hamas-war-november-2023-trending-antisemitic-narratives-calls-to-violence/; INSS. Arabic and English Antisemitism on Social Media Platforms Post-October 7, 14-15. 2024. https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/special-publication-041124.pdf.
[11] CyberWell. Online Antisemitism: 2024 Annual Report, 2. 2024. https://cyberwell.org/reports/online-antisemitism-2024-annual-report
[12] CyberWell. The State of Online Antisemitism 2025, 2. 2025.
[13] CyberWell. Online Antisemitism: 2024 Annual Report, 2. 2024; CyberWell. The State of Online Antisemitism 2025, 3. 2025. CyberWell’s monitoring also found a significant rise in general antisemitic rhetoric across all platforms after the October 7 attacks, with an 86% in the three weeks immediately following 7 October and an overall increase of 36% across the following 11 months. See CyberWell. The Evolution of Online Antisemitism: Pre- & Post October 7, 2. 2024. https://cyberwell.org/reports/the-evolution-of-online-antisemitism-pre-post-october-7/.
[14] Anti-Defamation League. “Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI) and the Israel-Hamas War.” November 10, 2023. https://www.adl.org/resources/article/generative-artificial-intelligence-gai-and-israel-hamas-war; CyberWell. “Iran, Incitement, and the Internet: How Geopolitical Conflict Reflects Online Antisemitism”. 2025. https://cyberwell.org/iran-incitement-and-the-internet/; Antisemitism Policy Trust. Online Antisemitism and the Risks of Artificial Intelligence. 2024. https://antisemitism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/7112-APT-Ai-and-Anitsemitism-v4.pdf; Combat Antisemitism Movement. “Major Music Streaming Platforms Host Songs Calling to Globalize the Intifada and Bomb Tel Aviv.” November 24, 2025. https://combatantisemitism.org/cam-news/major-music-streaming-platforms-host-songs-calling-to-globalize-the-intifada-and-bomb-tel-aviv/.
[15] The Times of Israel. “Purported Manifesto of DC Shooting Suspect Appears Online”. May 22, 2025. https://www.timesofisrael.com/purported-manifesto-of-dc-shooting-suspect-appears-online/.
[16] CyberWell. Denial and Conspiratorial Self-Victimization in Antisemitic Discourse. 2026. https://cyberwell.org/reports/denial-and-conspiratorial-self-victimization-in-antisemitic-discourse/; CyberWell. “Antisemitism Trend Alert: Denial of the October 7 Massacre on Social Media Platforms”. 2024.https://cyberwell.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Denial-of-October-7-Social-Media-Trend-Alert-CyberWell.pdf.
[17] CyberWell. Denial and Conspiratorial Self-Victimization in Antisemitic Discourse, 5, 8. 2026.
[18] Anti-Defamation League. “Extremists and Conspiracy Theorists Deny the Capital Jewish Museum Shooting With ‘False Flag’ Narrative.” May 23, 2025. https://www.adl.org/resources/article/extremists-and-conspiracy-theorists-deny-capital-jewish-museum-shooting-false; CyberWell. “Antisemitic Incitement and Hate Online: Aftermath of the Capital Jewish Museum Shooting in Washington”. 2025. https://cyberwell.org/reports/antisemitic-incitement-hate-online-aftermath-of-the-capital-jewish-museum-shooting-in-washington/.
[19] Online Hate Prevention Institute. Bondi Beach Chanukah Massacre, 58–71. 14 January 2026. https://ohpi.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Bondi-Beach-Chanukah-Massacre-small.pdf; CyberWell. Bondi Beach Terror Attack: How Social Media Globalised a Community’s Trauma. 2026.
https://cyberwell.org/reports/bondi-beach-terror-attack-how-social-media-globalised-a-communitys-trauma/; Combat Antisemitism Movement. “Snapshot Study: Bondi Beach Hanukkah Massacre Triggers Online Surge of Anti-Israel Conspiracy Claims.” December 17, 2025. https://combatantisemitism.org/studies-reports/snapshot-study-bondi-beach-hanukkah-massacre-triggers-online-surge-of-anti-israel-conspiracy-claims/.
[20] CyberWell. Denial and Conspiratorial Self-Victimization in Antisemitic Discourse, 5.
[21] Federal Trade Commission. “Social Media Bots and Deceptive Advertising: Report to Congress”. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/social-media-bots-advertising-ftc-report-congress/socialmediabotsreport.pdf; Fredheim, Rolf, and Sebastian Bay. “How Social Media Companies Are Failing to Combat Inauthentic Behaviour Online”. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, December 2019. https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/how-social-media-companies-are-failing-to-combat-inauthentic-behaviour-online/33; Shao, Chengcheng, et al. “The Spread of Misinformation by Social Bots”. Indiana University, December 2017.
[22] CyberWell. Antisemitism Trend Alert: Denial of the October 7 Massacre on Social Media Platforms. 2024. https://cyberwell.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Denial-of-October-7-Social-Media-Trend-Alert-CyberWell.pdf.
[23] Cyabra. Bot Neworks Amplify Controversial US Influencers. https://cyabra.com/reports/disinformation-hamas-israel-war/.
[24] CyberWell. “Bondi Beach Terror Attack: How Social Media Globalised a Community’s Trauma”, 8. 2026. See also Combat Antisemitism Movement, “Snapshot Study: Bondi Beach Hanukkah Massacre”.
[25] CyberWell. “Charlie Kirk’s Assassination Inspires Antisemitic Accusations and Slurs Online...”. Facebook, September 17, 2025. https://www.facebook.com/CyberWell.org/posts/charlie-kirks-assassination-inspires-antisemitic-accusations-and-slurs-onlinewit/782542654511755/; Southern Poverty Law Center. “Charlie Kirk and Antisemitic Conspiracy Theories”. October 28, 2025 https://www.splcenter.org/resources/hatewatch/charlie-kirk-antisemitic-conspiracy-theories/; The Jerusalem Post. “Antisemitic, anti-Israel conspiracy theories surge following Charlie Kirk's assassination”. September 14, 2025. https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/article-867435; CyberWell. “As Wildfires Continue to Burn in Los Angeles…” Instagram, January 22, 2025.
https://www.instagram.com/cyberwell_org/p/DFIdQaut8xO/; Combat Antisemitism Movement. “Los Angeles Wildfires Exploited to Scapegoat Jews and Israel and Promote Antisemitic Conspiracy Theories”. January 17, 2025. https://combatantisemitism.org/studies-reports/los-angeles-wildfires-exploited-to-scapegoat-jews-and-israel-and-promote-antisemitic-conspiracy-theories/; Anti-Defamation League. “Los Angeles Wildfires Trigger Conspiracy Theories and Hate”. 10 January 2025. https://www.adl.org/resources/article/los-angeles-wildfires-trigger-conspiracy-theories-and-hate; CyberWell. “Developments in Venezuela Are Moving Fast…” Facebook, January 14, 2026.
[26] ADL. “Hate Symbol: 109/110”. https://www.adl.org/resources/hate-symbol/109110.
[27] CyberWell. The State of Online Antisemitism 2025, 3.
[28] CyberWell. Denial and Conspiratorial Self-Victimization in Antisemitic Discourse, 11.
[29] American Jewish Committee. The State of Antisemitism in America 2024–2025: Findings and Recommendations for Major Digital Platforms, 41. 2026. https://www.ajc.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2026-03/SOAR2025-Social-Media-Report.pdf; CyberWell. “‘Promised 3,000 Years Ago’ Antisemitic AI-Generated Meme Takes Flight Online”. 2025. https://cyberwell.org/news-releases/promised-3000-years-ago-antisemitic-ai-generated-meme-takes-flight-online/; Anti-Defamation League. “Coded Hate: Extremists Weaponize Seemingly Innocuous Content to Promote Bigotry.” July 8, 2025. https://www.adl.org/resources/article/coded-hate-extremists-weaponize-seemingly-innocuous-content-promote-bigotry; Middle East Media Research Institute. “The New Battle for Holocaust Memory in the Age of AI”. April 14, 2026; https://www.memri.org/reports/new-battle-holocaust-memory-age-ai; Anti-Defamation League. “Innovative AI Video Generators Produce Antisemitic, Hateful and Violent Outputs”. October 24, 2025. https://www.adl.org/resources/article/innovative-ai-video-generators-produce-antisemitic-hateful-and-violent-outputs.
[30] TikTok. “AI-Generated Content Policy”. 2024. https://support.tiktok.com/en/using-tiktok/creating-videos/ai-generated-content; TikTok. “Community Guidelines: Edited Media and AI-Generated Content”. 2025. https://www.tiktok.com/safety/en/policies-and-engagement/integrity-authenticity; Meta. “Our Approach to Labeling AI-Generated Content and Manipulated Media”. 2024. https://about.fb.com/news/2024/04/metas-approach-to-labeling-ai-generated-content-and-manipulated-media/.
[31] YouTube. “How YouTube Works: AI”. https://www.youtube.com/intl/en_be/howyoutubeworks/ai/.
[32] Under its Synthetic and Manipulated Media policy, X includes a clause on “Inauthentic Content”, which states: “You may not share inauthentic media, including, manipulated, or out-of-context media that may result in widespread confusion on public issues, impact public safety, or cause serious harm (‘misleading media’)”. See X. “Rules and Policies: Inauthentic Content”. 2025. https://help.x.com/en/rules-and-policies/authenticity. On March 3, 2026, X also rolled out a new provision that addresses the following: “[…] Users who post AI-generated images of an armed conflict – without adding a disclosure that it was made with AI – will be suspended from Creator Revenue Sharing for 90 days. Subsequent violations will result in a permanent suspension from the program […]”. See X. “Creator Revenue Sharing Policy Update”. March 3, 2026. https://x.com/nikitabier/status/2028873177028555201. However, X does not have a specific, comprehensive policy framework dedicated solely to AIGC.
[33] Carl Miller et al., Antisemitism on Twitter Before and After Elon Musk’s Acquisition (London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2023).
[34] Center for Countering Digital Hate. How Twitter/X Continues to Host Posts Reported for Extreme Hate Speech. September 13, 2023.
[35] Australian Government. “National AI Plan: Keep Australians Safe”. https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/national-ai-plan/keep-australians-safe#building-on-actions-79-whats-next.
[36] Australian Government. “Australia to Establish New Institute to Strengthen AI Safety”. https://www.industry.gov.au/news/australia-establish-new-institute-strengthen-ai-safety.
[37] eSafety Commissioner. “Industry codes”. https://www.esafety.gov.au/industry/codes
[38] Ahamed, V. K. (2024). Case analysis navigating social media defamation: Exploring liability for third-party publications in the digital age (the case of Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Voller). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/395397235; Hall & Wilcox. “On the hook via Facebook: High Court upholds potential liability for the defamatory comments of strangers”. https://hallandwilcox.com.au/news/on-the-hook-via-facebook-high-court-upholds-potential-liability-for-the-defamatory-comments-of-strangers/
[39] International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. “Working Definition of Antisemitism”. https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism.
[40] CyberWell. CyberWell Policy Recommendations | Regarding Meta Oversight Board Cases Involving Coded Language and Racial Discrimination via Emojis. https://cyberwell.org/reports/cyberwell-policy-recommendations-regarding-meta-oversight-board-cases-involving-coded-language-and-racial-discrimination-via-emojis/.
[41] Business Insider. “X Shows Locations Users About This Account”. November 2025. https://www.businessinsider.com/x-shows-locations-users-about-this-account-2025-11.
